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DEEP IN THE HEART OF NORTH AMERICA: TEXAS & THE FUTURE OF 
NORTH AMERICAN ENERGY TRADE  
 
Guillermo J. Garcia Sanchez & James W. Coleman* 
Texas, the heart of North American energy markets, has recently 
emerged from history’s biggest oil boom, and is becoming the cross-
roads for an increasingly two-way trade in oil and gas. Texas and Mexico, 
in particular have much to gain from expanded energy trade. Texas has 
become a global center of natural gas and light crude oil production that 
can meet growing demand for power for Mexican consumers and fuel 
for Mexican refineries. And Mexico’s wind power resources in Tamau-
lipas would be most valuable if that power could be exported to centers 
of urban and industrial demand in Texas.  
Yet there is an increasing danger that this potential will be squandered. 
Growing movements against eminent domain, infrastructure permits, 
and energy exports in the United States and moves to re-nationalize the 
energy sector in Mexico are making energy companies increasingly wary 
of investing in the future of Texas-Mexico energy trade. Ironically, pol-
iticians on both sides of the border accuse each other of being the source 
of uncertainty for the future of the North American energy industry. 1  
This report shows how energy law changes in the U.S. and Mexico pre-
sent under-studied dangers to cross-border energy trade and will set an 
agenda for legal reform to enable mutually beneficial fuel and power 
trade. This report is the result of a two-year research supported by the 
Mission Foods Texas-Mexico Center grant. With the help of the grant, 
we were able to interview policy makers, practitioners, and stakeholders 
involved in U.S.-Mexico energy relations. The findings of our research 
and the interviews, set the grounds for the key recommendations pro-
posed in the report. The key final recommendations propose a set of 
 
 
* Associate Professor at Texas A&M University School of Law; Professor of Law at SMU 
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1 For example, Texas Governor Greg Abbott wrote directly to President Lopez Obrador 
complaining about the impact that his new energy policies are having on Texas producers. 
Robbie Whelan, Legal Tussle Prevents $2.5 Billion Gas Pipeline to Mexico From Opening, WALL 
STREET JOURNAL, August 19, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/legal-tussle-prevents-2-5-
billion-gas-pipeline-to-mexico-from-opening-11566229406 (last visited Jan 26, 2021).; on the 
Mexican side, President Lopez Obrador’s administration officially complained about Gov. 
Abbott’s executive emergency order to halt natural gas exports outside of the state during the 
Texas black out of February 2021. Mexico presses U.S. to guarantee natural gas supplies after 
Texas export ban, REUTERS, February 18, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mexico-
lng-supply-idUSKBN2AI05C (last visited Sep 3, 2021).  
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energy principles that could be adopted either by the United States Mex-
ico Canada Agreement USMCA partners or by direct negotiations be-
tween Texas and Mexico to secure the benefits of increased energy trade 
and increase cooperation in energy and climate policy. These principles 
could be the basis of an international agreement, but could also be 
adopted through other transnational norm instruments, such as letters 
of intent or memorandums of understanding among the key stake hold-
ers. Regardless of the adopted form, we believe they serve as a guideline 
to regulate the already integrated energy region and bring transparency, 
and efficiency to this relationship.  
 
Key Policy Recommendations: 
• Non-discriminatory access to energy infrastructure and freedom of energy 
transit. Both countries should adopt clear rules that give partner 
country companies access to existing infrastructure, including 
transit-related infrastructure, and should not prevent companies 
from building new capacity when existing transit infrastructure 
is insufficient. 
• Investment protection principles for North American energy companies. 
Both countries should adopt clear rules on expropriation and 
nationalization of energy assets, including formulas for compen-
sation that contemplate market values, rates of return, and for-
mulas to estimate future prices. 
• Principles for regulator’s decision-making processes and coordination on en-
ergy data. Energy regulators should have independence and adopt 
clear rules that do not discriminate against foreign entities and 
have a guiding principle or integrating the energy markets. 
• Principles on cooperation in security and energy supply. Taking into ac-
count the interdependence of energy markets and the emergency 
situations faced by the region in the past decades, the energy 
partners should adopt protocols that recognize the principle to 
cooperate in emergency situations and alleviate the supply needs 
of the region. 
• Joint decision-making bodies. These energy partners should work to 
create a North American commission that serves as a connecting 
point for coordinating energy policies to further integrate the 
region, but that also serves a platform for discussing government 
decisions that might negatively impact the energy principles. 
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• Cooperation for joint environmental and safety standards. Both nations 
should cooperate as much as possible in setting harmonized en-
vironmental and safety standards for the industry. 
• Transboundary resources related principles. The U.S. and Mexico 
should take the existing transboundary agreements on the joint 
development of resources at the borderline and integrate them 
in their energy relationship. 
• Community engagement principles. The construction of energy related 
infrastructure in the region has direct impacts on different com-
munities, many of them historically disenfranchised from the de-
cision-making process of governments. The United States and 
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The United States has moved to the center of global energy markets, as 
the world’s biggest producer of both oil and natural gas and Texas is the center 
of this titanic industry.2 At the same time, the United States lies at the nexus 
of North American energy markets, bordering two important energy powers 
in Canada and Mexico. The United States and Canada have long had the 
world’s most important bilateral energy relationship, with two-way flows of 
oil, gas, and electricity.3 But there is a new opportunity to construct an equally 
important relationship between the United States and Mexico.4 New oil and 
gas production in the United States is reaching growing markets in Mexico and 
Mexico has the potential for new production of oil, gas, and renewable energy 
that would most naturally be exported to the United States. 
Yet there is an increasing danger that this potential will be squandered. 
Officials on both sides of the border are neglecting the potential of integrated 
North American energy markets. To the contrary the energy and its regional 
legal architecture have been frequently hijacked for political purposes. For ex-
ample, after Mexican President Lopez Obrador forced a renegotiation of the 
pipeline contracts that export Texas natural gas to Mexico, Texas Governor 
Greg Abbott wrote, “Lingering questions about Mexico-U.S.-Canada project 
delays and longstanding contracts and business commitments could negatively 
impact our economies for years to come.”5  A year later, Mexico officially com-
plained about Gov. Abbott’s order to halt the same natural gas exports to 
 
 
2 According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration Texas is the top crude 
and natural gas producing U.S. state. It accounts for around 43% of the nation’s crude 
oil production and 26% of its marketed natural gas production. Texas Profile, , 
https://www.eia.gov/state/print.php?sid=TX (last visited Nov 12, 2021). For a re-
view of the increase of U.S. natural gas exports see Natural gas imports and exports - 
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), , https://www.eia.gov/energyex-
plained/natural-gas/imports-and-exports.php (last visited Nov 12, 2021). 
3 AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, North American Energy (2019), 
https://www.api.org/-/media/Files/Policy/Trade/North-American-Energy-
Onepager.pdf?la=en&hash=855A31713B8CB8FDFAFAA50E24467F4F72E06B18 
(last visited Mar 29, 2021). 
4 U.S.-Mexico Energy Relations | Wilson Center, , 
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/us-mexico-energy-relations (last visited 
Sep 20, 2021). (describing the interdependence of energy markets and recommending 
further interinstitutional dialogues to enhance the region’s potential) 
5 Whelan, supra note 2. The U.S. Congress has also publicly complained to the last two U.S. 
Presidents’, Donald J Trump and Joe Biden, for Mexico’s reluctance to respect its USMCA 
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Mexico during the Texas blackout that left millions of Mexican households 
without power.6 The common argument on both sides is clear: the neighboring 
partner’s actions against energy businesses breach the spirit of the recently ap-
proved U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA).7 Regardless of the political 
back-and-forth, the key fact is that U.S. and Mexican leaders have not built a 
sustainable legal framework that puts energy integration and the protection of 
energy investments at the center.  
Energy trade has flourished between Canada and the U.S. partly due to the 
existence of clear international trade rules between the two partners.8 The 
NAFTA 1994 deal contemplated an energy chapter that allowed for invest-
ment and trade in the sector to flow.9 Trade and foreign direct investment 
protections of the 1990s NAFTA, however, did not contemplate the energy 
sector in Mexico.10 On the contrary, the 1994 North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) excluded the Mexican energy sector from the applica-
tion of the trade deal.11  
 
 
commitments to energy investors, see U.S. lawmakers complain to Trump over Mexican energy policy, 
REUTERS, October 23, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-mexico-energy-
idUSKBN2782BH (last visited Sep 6, 2021); Sheky Espejo, Lawmakers urge Biden to address con-
cerns of US energy companies in Mexico (2021), https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-in-
sights/latest-news/oil/072121-lawmakers-urge-biden-to-address-concerns-of-us-energy-
companies-in-mexico (last visited Sep 6, 2021). 
6 Mexico presses U.S. to guarantee natural gas supplies after Texas export ban, supra note 2. 
7 United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Nov. 30, 2018, 134 Stat.  11, art. 
32.5 (2020), https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/ united-states-mex-
ico-canada-agreement/agreement-between [hereinafter USMCA]. 
8 In addition to NAFTA’s Chapter 6 on Energy Trade, the U.S. and Canada also signed in 
1977 the Transit Pipeline Agreement. See The Agreement between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of Canada concerning Transit Pipelines, signed 
at Washington on January 28, 1977, available at https://www.congress.gov/treaty-docu-
ment/95th-congress/6?s=1&r=84 
9 Roberto Rios Herran & Pietro Poretti, Energy Trade and Investment under the North American Free 
Trade Agreement, 34 in REGULATION OF ENERGY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW. WTO, 
NAFTA AND ENERGY CHARTER 335–372 (2011); Bradly J Condon, Mexican Energy Reform and 
NAFTA Chapter 11: Articles 20 and 21 of the Hydrocarbons Law and Access to Investment Arbitration, 
9 THE JOURNAL OF WORLD ENERGY LAW & BUSINESS 203–218 (2016). 
10 Guillermo J Garcia Sanchez, The Mexican Petroleum License of 2013: A Step to the Past to Bring 
Mexico into the Present and the Grounds for an Uncertain Future, in THE NATURE OF PETROLEUM 
LICENSES , 27 (Tina Hunter, Jorn Oyrehagen Sunde, & Ernst Nordtveit eds., 2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3396727 (last visited Aug 25, 2020). 
11 Rios Herran and Poretti, supra note 10.; In addition to the rules set up in the energy chapter 
of the 1994 NAFTA, the U.S. and Canada also signed in 1977 the Transit Pipeline Treaty that 
according to Kristen van de Biezenbos and James Coleman it has proved “crucial to preserving 
these energy links by providing an unexpected bulwark against changing US environmental 
priorities at the state and federal level.” Van de Biezenbos, Coleman – A 40-year-old Treaty 
Could Save Line 5, RESEARCH INSTITUTE CANADA | CANADA ECONOMY NEWS | CANADIAN 
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Since the 1938 Mexican expropriation of the sector the extraction of hy-
drocarbons, the refining of petroleum products, the retail sale of gasoline; and 
the production, distribution, and sale of energy were all in the exclusive control 
of state-owned companies.12 Foreign businesses were allowed to provide ser-
vices, not partnerships, to Mexican state enterprises, but their deals were ex-
cluded from the protections set up in Chapter 11 of NAFTA.13 In those days 
Mexico’s energy sector was focalized primarily to supplying electricity to the 
domestic market and selling hydrocarbons internationally to receive revenues 
to finance the government’s budget. The system worked well until the major 
oil fields in the coast of Campeche, primarily Cantarell, reached peak produc-
tion.14 The Mexican state-owned company, PEMEX, was highly taxed by the 
government and had oriented most of its investments into existing production, 
as opposed to expand its proven reserves and exploring new fields.15 By the 
late 1990s PEMEX was highly in debt and inefficient in bringing new fields 
into production. At the same time, CFE lacked sufficient investments to keep 
up with the growing demand for electricity.16 The government in the 1990s 
tried to expand investment in the sector by creating long-term contracts with 
CFE for electricity generation by private parties.17 However, CFE maintained 
the monopoly over transmission and distribution, and maintained the role of 
manager of the generation. In addition to underinvestment in capital stock, the 
government subsidized energy prices and most of CFE’s electricity generation 
plants were highly dependent on fossil fuels. By early 2000, oil wells began to 
dry, the costs of electricity generation increased, and the lack of investment in 
new exploration fields led the government to push for an opening of the sec-
tor.  
Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto’s 2013 energy reform both con-
templated a tighter energy links within North America, with the prospect that 
the U.S. and Mexico might have an energy relationship as close and mutually 
beneficial as that between the U.S. and Canada. The reform for the first time 
allowed private companies to invest in the electricity and hydrocarbons sector. 
The opening of the sectors included the generation of electricity by private 
parties, with an emphasis on renewables, the participation in the production 
 
 
GOVERNMENT POLICY , https://www.cdhowe.org/intelligence-memos/van-de-biezenbos-
coleman-%E2%80%93-40-year-old-treaty-could-save-line-5 (last visited Sep 7, 2021). 
12 Garcia Sanchez, supra note 11 at 5–6. 
13 Id. 
14 Garcia Sanchez, supra note 11 at 11.  
15 Id. at 11. 
16 Peter Nance, Initial Results from the Mexico Electricity Reform, WILSON CENTER MEXICO INSTI-
TUTE 1 (2018). 
17 Id. 
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and exploration of hydrocarbons, and the sale of gasoline to consumers.18 In 
the view of the drafters of the reform, for the State-owned companies to be-
come more efficient, they are required to focus on their strengths (i.e. shallow 
waters and inland conventional fields for PEMEX and transmission of energy 
for CFE), compete with private actors in an open bidding market, and associ-
ate in those areas where their technological or financial capacities where 
weak.19 In other words, CFE and PEMEX were to keep some minor privileges 
in their sectors but had to compete or associate with other private actors in the 
market. The government gave assurances to the private companies that their 
investments would be protected under international treaties, giving as such the 
impression that Mexico had unilaterally amended the NAFTA 1994 exclu-
sions. 20 As Subsection IV.C will show NAFTA’s successor, the USMCA, 
failed to update the deal with an energy chapter that would contemplate the 
reality of actual energy integration.  
This report shows how energy law changes in the U.S. and Mexico present 
under-studied dangers to cross-border energy trade and will set an agenda for 
legal reform to enable mutually beneficial fuel and power trade. And it will 
propose the foundations for a new energy agreements that could be adopted 
either by the USMCA partners or by direct negotiations between Texas and 
Mexico to secure the benefits of increased energy trade.  
The argument unfolds as follows. Part II explains the theory of market 
integration between independent sovereigns—the benefits of different levels 
of integration and the legal infrastructure necessary to achieve them.  Part III 
explains some of the market opportunities for increased United States-Mexico 
energy trade and illustrates these opportunities by explaining important ways 
that energy producers and consumers are already taking advantage of these 
opportunities. Part IV explains some of the emerging obstacles to increased 
North American energy trade, highlighting local and national challenges to 
cross-border supply chains from both sides of the border. Part V lays out a 
reform agenda to harness the benefits of integrated energy markets and out-
lines a proposed bilateral agreement to foster this integration. 
 
 
18 Duncan Wood & Jeremy Martin, Of Paradigm Shifts and Political Conflict: The History 
of Mexico’s Second Energy Revolution, in MEXICO’S NEW ENERGY REFORM 17–35. 
19 Id. 
20 Guillermo Jose Garcia Sanchez, The Fine print of the Mexican Energy Reform, in MEXICO´S NEW 
ENERGY REFORM 36–52 (2018); Garcia Sanchez, supra note 11; Condon, supra note 10. 
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II. DEFINING AND CREATING ENERGY INTEGRATED MARKETS 
Over the past 120 years, North America has reaped the benefits of inte-
grated energy markets.21 In times of energy plenty, oil producers in each coun-
try have relied on consumers in their continental neighbors.22 When demand 
has outstripped domestic supply—as it sometimes has in each country—im-
ports from these neighbors have prevented price spikes. And Canada, the 
United States, and Mexico have been important, if sometimes inconstant, en-
ergy allies through geopolitical energy crises.23 Despite these longstanding ben-
efits, energy integration is under-theorized as a concept and encompasses dif-
ferent levels of market entanglement—from mere export and import of prod-
ucts, to common companies and cross-border supply chains, to common en-
ergy policy. This section explains the benefits of each level of integration and 
the legal means necessary and sufficient to achieve them. 
 
A. Why Energy Differs from Other Commodities in Trade and 
Investment Agreements 
 
Energy plays a complex role in international economic law.24 At times, en-
ergy is regulated by agreements involving the trade of natural resources that 
are employed in the production of heat or electricity, primarily fossil fuels such 
as hydrocarbons, or the trade of electricity across borderlines.25 At times en-
ergy is regulated in agreements by attending the investments done in construc-
tion of extractive sites involving energy sources or in power facilities that gen-
erate heat or electricity.26  Energy, as such, has many complexities that differ-
entiate it from other commodities and it requires a distinctive approach if a 
region is to be integrated.27 For example, the starting point of any international 
 
 
21 An American Petroleum Institute report issues during the NAFTA renegotiations argued 
that the existing framework already achieve a good level of market integration. NAFTA Works 
– For the U.S. and U.S. Energy, , https://www.api.org:443/news-policy-and-is-
sues/blog/2018/03/02/nafta-works-for-the-us-and-us-energy (last visited Sep 6, 2021). 
22 YERGIN, DANIEL, THE NEW MAP 1–68 (2020). (describing the historical changes 
in North American energy production and the relationships built among Canada, 
Mexico and the U.S.) 
23 Id. at 1–68. 
24 ANNA-ALEXANDRA MARHOLD, ENERGY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW. 7–8 
(2021). (describing the different uses of the term “energy” in international trade law) 
25 Id. at 7–8. 
26 PETER D. CAMERON, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY INVESTMENT LAW THE PURSUIT 
OF STABILITY (2010). 
27 Yulia Selivanova, Managing the Patchwork of Agreement in Trade and Investment, in GLOBAL EN-
ERGY GOVERNANCE. THE NEW RULES OF THE GAME 49, 49–50 (Andreas Goldthau & Jean 
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trade agreement is to facilitate the access of foreign suppliers to the domestic 
market.28 The GATT/WTO regime primarily aimed to reduce import tariffs 
so that foreign companies can access the local market.29 In contrast, for energy 
markets to be fully integrated countries must allow foreign suppliers of energy 
commodities, including state-controlled suppliers, to access their export infra-
structure (i.e. production sites, storage units and transportation infrastructure 
such as railroads or pipelines).30 For the energy sector to be integrated, export 
barriers are just as important as import barriers. In fact, “import restrictions 
are not particularly problematic in the energy sector- on the contrary, states 
have been more concerned with securing access to energy suppliers at afford-
able prices.”31  
The production of energy has additional characteristics that require atten-
tion when the goal is to integrate a region. First, many energy products, partic-
ularly hydrocarbons, are finite non-renewable resources.32 Moreover, they are 
unevenly distributed around the globe. The same could be said of certain re-
newables, even if they are more widely spread, they cannot be settled every-
where. Renewable sources of energy, such as solar panels or wind turbines, 
require to be installed where the geological fundamentals are present. Wind 
and sunlight need to be relatively consistent and transmission infrastructure 
needs to be in place in order for the investment to be successful.  Manufac-
tured products do not rely on geological or physical characteristics for their 
production sites, but rather on competitive advantages of cities or regions. The 
 
 
Martin Witte eds., 2010).; see also, Alan Yanovich, WTO Rules and the Energy Sector, IN REGU-
LATION OF ENERGY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 1, 1-49 (2011) (describing how the 
WTO system does not deal specifically with energy but that touches on energy commodities 
in a way that generates inefficiencies and challenges); Sophie Nappert & Federico Ortino, In-
ternational Resolution of Energy Trade and Investment Disputes, 34 in REGULATION OF ENERGY IN 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW. WTO, NAFTA AND ENERGY CHARTER 302–333 (2011). (de-
scribing how the dispute resolution mechanism set up for the WTO is inefficient in dealing 
with energy disputes, and finding that the arbitration system recognized in the investment 
protection sections of trade agreements have a higher level of effectiveness at least when it 
comes to investment in energy services but not for trade of energy commodities); Rios Herran 
and Poretti, supra note 10. (arguing that NAFTA was an advancement, compared to the WTO 
rules, in regulating the trade of energy products among the Northern American partners but 
that it felt short of fully integrating the region due to Mexico’s five exclusions/exceptions) 
28 Id. (all of the authors mention the market access bias of the GATT/WTO system that serves 
as a basis of international trade agreements.) 
29 Id. 
30 By energy commodities here we mean energy sources such as gas, oil, coal, and 
nuclear material.  
31 Yulia Selivanova, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY GOVERNANCE: THE ROLE OF 
THE ENERGY CHARTER |, 106 AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PRO-
CEEDINGS 394–398, 395 (2012). 
32 Id. 
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economic fundamentals, rather than the geological ones, are the most im-
portant driving factor for most manufactured products.  
Second, many energy commodities, particularly those that require extrac-
tion from the subsoil, are controlled and in certain jurisdictions owned by the 
government (in the U.S. both offshore and on onshore federal lands, in Mexico 
in all the territory, and in Canada by the provinces).33 As an important source 
of revenue for the States, there is an eagerness to capture as much rent as 
possible from oil and gas extraction.34 The theory is that the rents serve a 
broader public purpose to finance important government programs and poli-
cies. Moreover, the fact that these are finite forces the State to derive maximum 
rent for their depletion. A series of policies arise out of these facts: export taxes 
become an important source for extracting the rents; special windfall taxes are 
attached to the projects; high national content requirements are forced into the 
investments; associations with state-owned companies are imposed as part of 
the exploration and production (E&P) contracts; domestic production quotas 
are required from private producers, etc. In trade agreements, such as the 
GATT/WTO, export restrictions are poorly addressed and export duties are 
unbound; moreover, the trade regime ignores issues involving ownership of 
national resources or access to energy supply.35  
Third, energy trade takes place through fixed infrastructure.36 This is both 
for the purpose of moving hydrocarbons or carrying electricity from the pro-
duction sites to the processing plants and the consumers.37 Commodities in 
general share infrastructure and is interchangeable, depending on market 
prices. Energy infrastructure once built is not interchangeable: natural gas 
pipelines; electricity transmission lines or oil platforms are a capital-intensive 
infrastructure that once in place has a single purpose. One exception is the use 
of trains to transport crude oil, but even there, oil transport depends on rail 
routes made to connect producing fields with oil refineries, as well as long term 
investment in tanker car loading and unloading facilities.  
Connected to the last point, the energy sector is highly capital-intensive in 
all of its stages: exploration, production, and transportation. Infrastructure is 
 
 
33 Guillermo Garcia Sanchez, The Mexican Petroleum License of 2013, in THE CHARACTER OF 
PETROLEUM LICENSES: A LEGAL CULTURE ANALYSIS (Tina Soliman Hunter, Jørn Øyrehagen 
Sunde, & Ernst Nordtveit eds., 1st ed. 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3396727 (last 
visited Jun 26, 2020). 
34 Guillermo Jose Garcia Sanchez, A Critical Approach to International Investment Law, the Hydro-
carbons Industry, and Its Relation to Domestic Institutions, 57 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOUR-
NAL 475 (2016). 
35 Alan Yanovich, WTO Rules and the Energy Sector, 34 in REGULATION OF ENERGY IN 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW. WTO, NAFTA AND ENERGY CHARTER 1–48 (2011). 
36 Selivanova, supra note 32 at 395–96. 
37 Id. at 395–396. 
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essential for the sector. Without the constructions of long-term stable grids to 
transport electricity, it would not make economic sense to produce electricity; 
without the necessary pipeline capacity to transport natural gas, it is hard to 
make a long-term profit and the product would end up being flared; offshore 
deep-water platforms have very low reuse rate and require specific onshore 
supply centers and ports.38 Most particularly, electricity and gas are costly and 
difficult to store. Without adequate infrastructure to transport them the eco-
nomic fundamentals would not make sense. This is not the case with most 
commodities that are internationally traded. Most of the infrastructure built of 
other commodities can be shared, transformed, or moved to another location.  
In many jurisdictions the existing energy transportation and distribution 
infrastructure is controlled by a handful of actors, including state-owned com-
panies in Mexico’s case. The control of these actors prevents outside compa-
nies from accessing the infrastructure claiming lack of capacity and/or charg-
ing fees that raise the cost of the investment to an uncompetitive level.  
Hence, international agreements that seek to ensure a long-standing energy 
integration must contemplate rules that allow access to energy transportation 
and distribution infrastructure. An energy integration treaty must, for example, 
contemplate principles that prioritizes transit flows over other priorities. The 
costs of disruption in transit flows could jeopardize energy projects. For many 
projects the availability of capacity at the contracted time is essential for the 
success of the project. For a company to build a grid or a pipeline and be 
unable to deliver the products on the agreed time and moment, could be dis-
astrous. Energy infrastructure is built and financed considering programmed 
volumes, expandable capacity, and backed by long-term supply contracts.  En-
ergy infrastructure contracts are financed relying on those conditions, other-
wise the companies would be unable to guarantee repayment. Hence, when 
facing any dispute, a principle that ensures transit flows regardless of the out-
come is essential.39  In other words, treaties must include a freedom of energy 
transit principle that includes not only the non-discriminatory use of existing 
infrastructure but the possibility of expanding the transit capacity if needed.40 
In addition to a treaty recognition of these principles an effective frame-
work for investment protections and the resolution of disputes is needed. It is 




38 CAMERON, supra note 27 at 4–7. 
39 For example, the Energy Charter Treaty lays down the principle of freedom of energy transit 
and non-discrimination on the basis of origin, destination, ownership, or pricing of energy 
materials and products, see The Energy Charter Treaty, 34 I.L.M. 360, 385 (1995) [hereinafter 
ECT] 
40 Selivanova, supra note 32 at 396. (Silanova calls them, non-interruption of transit flow and 
non-impediment for building new infrastructure if available capacity is insufficient principles) 
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B. Import and Export Integration 
 
The lowest level of integration would be a market where there is a free 
flow of energy related products to both sides of the border. This includes not 
only the actual fuels, such as gas and oil or the transmission of electricity, but 
also the components connected to the operation of the industry (petrochemi-
cals, light crude for the refineries, technology, and equipment to build energy 
infrastructure – from drills to wind tribune components or solar panels, etc.). 
The next level of integration would involve rules that foster the transfer of 
products in a region with nonrestrictive rules. For example, rules that allow 
parties to consider the energy resource from the region for purposes of export, 
this is particularly important for the case of certain products that require the 
use of imported fuels for their processing – think about lighter crude that gets 
mixed with heavier crudes in order for it to be refined and then exported. 
Other restrictive rules could be import and export permits that are restrictive 
to the capacity of the companies to trade among partners. 
 
C. Common Company and Supply Chain Integration 
 
The next level of integration is the reduction of barriers that prevent inte-
grated supply chains, beyond the two previously described ones, both for the 
purpose of trade among partners but also to allow companies to plan to oper-
ate as a regional block that could export products to other jurisdictions. For 
example, in the case of the USMCA region, it would be necessary to reduce 
barriers to allow Texas producers to use Mexico as a platform to export to 
Asian markets, or Canadian Tar sands being brought to Houston to be refined 
and then exported to other jurisdictions.  
Some of the rules that would be required for this level of integration are 
clear protection of foreign direct investments that mitigate long term risks, 
non-discriminatory regulatory agencies, access to markets, and export permits 
that allow regional partnerships to associate. 
D. Common Energy Policy Integration 
 
The final level of integration is a common government approach to energy 
challenges in the region and a coordination among government actors to ad-
dress them. This level of integration would involve having executive powers, 
regulatory agencies, and local actors coordinating as a block to address chal-
lenges such as carbon reduction, energy security, government dependency on 
oil revenues, etc. For example, if the governments would agree that as a block 
they would focus on the production of less polluting oil fields, or the construc-
tion of energy infrastructure in areas that have a lower social and environmen-
tal impact, but at the same time secure the flow of energy products to ensure 
energy security, you could have a truly integrated region.  
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This level of integration can help to solve some of the local challenges in 
regions that are not even integrated in their domestic market. This is particu-
larly clear in the case of the U.S. that is not in itself an integrated energy market. 
Each U.S. state has a number of barriers that prevent the national market from 
being integrated fully.  Integration with Mexico and Canada in a way helps the 
U.S. solve its local integration issue, but for this to happen, there must be a 
clear goal of integrating the regional market. For example, Texans can by-pass 
regulatory and permit barriers in New Mexico, Arizona, and California, by 
building or tapping on Mexican energy infrastructure that is regulated at a na-
tional level and access the pacific markets. And vice versa. Mexico can tap on 
existing energy infrastructure built for U.S. producers in the Gulf of Mexico, 
such as pipelines and cargo platforms, in order to send its oil to refineries in 
the Houston areas, as opposed to having to build new infrastructure to 
transport the products to the Mexican shore and refine them locally.  
  
III. OPPORTUNITIES FOR TEXAS-MEXICO ENERGY TRADE 
Texas is the heart of North American energy markets: it is the center of 
the biggest oil boom the world has ever seen and the crossroads for an increas-
ingly two-way trade in oil and gas.41 Texas and México in particular have much 
to gain from expanded energy trade in both oil and gas and electricity. 
 
A. Increased Oil & Gas Trade 
 
Texas has vast supplies of natural gas—it usually produces more than 
enough gas to provide power to its growing population and sometimes so 
much that producers must pay to have it taken away. Mexico, by contrast, is 
looking to provide more power to its residents and industry, making Texas gas 
a low-cost option.  
Mexico is also hoping to provide more reliable power to eliminate the need 
for diesel backups.42 Gas consumption for power generation has tripled since 
 
 
41 James W. Coleman, The Third Age of Oil and Gas Law, 95 IND. L.J. 389, 391 (2020). (“This 
Article unearths these histories and defines these two ages of oil and gas law that have built 
the modern legal world. It shows that we are now entering a third age of oil and gas law, which 
will be defined by the legal challenges posed by fracking and climate change. And it shows 
how landowners can ensure that they receive the full benefit of this decade’s oil boom— the 
biggest that the world has ever seen”).  
42 James W. Coleman, Pipelines & Power-Lines: Building the Energy Transport Future, 80 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 263, 273 (2019). (“As a result, fracking and new gas production have opened up wide 
natural gas price differentials around the world. Even markets in close proximity can have very 
different gas prices if there is not enough transport capacity to serve the demand in the high 
cost market: for example, while Pennsylvania and Texas have the cheapest natural gas in the 
world, nearby markets in Massachusetts and Mexico at times pay the world’s highest prices for 
natural gas”). 
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2000.43  Mexico is the second-largest electricity market in Latin America.44 Fall-
ing natural gas costs, conversion efficiencies, and new environmental consid-
erations have sparked a growing shift from oil-fired to gas-fired power gener-
ation.45  Since 2000, demand for natural gas in Mexico has increased by more 
than 70%.46 Mexico has allowed private investment in gas storage and pipelines 
since 1995.47 Pipeline infrastructure has been expanding in Mexico since that 
time.48 
U.S. natural gas exports to Mexico are crucial for both countries. About 
half of U.S. gas exports go to Mexico,49 and 94% of Mexico’s natural gas im-
ports come from the United States.50 With Mexico’s increased dependence on 




43 International Energy Agency (IEA), Mexico Energy Outlook, PARIS: ORGANIZATION FOR 
ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT [OECD]/IEA 129, 18 (2016). 
44 Nance, supra note 17 at 1. (“Mexico is currently the second-largest power market in Latin 
America and appears poised for continued growth”). 11/18/2021 4:23:00 PM 
45 Id. at 16.(“Due to falling costs for gas, more attractive conversion efficiencies, and environ-
mental considerations, the fuel mix has shifted from oil-fired to gas-fired generation. Between 
2012 and 2017, CFE has had a goal of reducing oil consumption by more than 80 percent. 
Although reaching this goal has proven elusive for fuel reliability reasons, progress has been 
made and can be expected to continue as gas pipeline expansions currently in progress are 
completed”).  
46 International Energy Agency (IEA), supra note 44 at 18. (“Demand for natural gas has in-
creased by more than 70% since 2000, with its share in the primary energy mix increasing from 
24% in 2000 to 32% in 2014. Fuel switching in the power sector, rising industrial demand and, 
more recently, the import opportunity that opened up for Mexico by the shale gas boom in 
the United States (and facilitated by Mexico’s policy of constructing new gas import pipelines) 
have accelerated the use of gas. The overall share of renewable energy has fallen slightly, to 
8.5% of total primary energy, reflecting in part the declining use of solid biomass, mainly fuel-
wood used by poorer households”). 
47 José Alberto Hernández Ibarzábal, Examining governability of Mexico’s natural gas transmission 
pipelines under the energy reform, 35 JOURNAL OF ENERGY & NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 271–291, 
273 (2017). 
48 Id. 11/18/2021 4:23:00 PMat 278; BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH DE-
PENDENCE IN THE ECONOMY (University of Michigan Press 1994).  
49 Robert Rapier, Mexico Is Our Most Important Natural Gas Export Market, FORBES , 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/rrapier/2019/06/02/mexico-is-our-most-important-natural-
gas-export-market/ (last visited Jul 25, 2020). 
50 Mexico Regulator Forecasts 25% Increase in U.S. Natural Gas Imports by 2024, , NATURAL 
GAS INTELLIGENCE (2019), https://www.naturalgasintel.com/mexico-regulator-forecasts-
25-increase-in-u-s-natural-gas-imports-by-2024/ (last visited Jul 25, 2020). 
51 International Energy Agency (IEA), supra note 44 at 24. (“However, the incentive to develop 
Mexico’s gas resources at scale has been weakened by the ready availability of gas for import, 
at very competitive prices, from southern US states. Gas imports from the United States have 
been increasing at an average annual rate of 26% over the past five years and now meet around 
40%of Mexico’s natural gas demand.”) 
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Texas also is producing unprecedented amounts of light crude oil that are 
a better match for Mexico’s refineries than for refineries in Texas because most 
Texas refineries are optimized for heavy crude.52 As a result, both Texas and 
Mexico are exporting more and more oil to each other’s refineries.53 These 
two-way trades started even in the early days of shale before Congress repealed 
the U.S. oil export ban—companies took advantage of an exception to the ban 
that allowed swapping crude oil.54 When Congress repealed the export ban in 
2015,55 two-way trade in crude quickly ramped up.56 Alongside the long-stand-
ing U.S.-Canada energy partnership, cooperation between the United States, 
 
 
52 James W Coleman, Beyond the Pipeline Wars: Reforming Environmental Assessment of Energy 
Transport Infrastructure, 2018 UTAH LAW REVIEW 119, 161 (2018).; International Energy 
Agency (IEA), supra note 44 at 23. (“A partial fix for some of Mexico’s refinery limitations has 
taken the form of joint ventures with US refiners, such as the Deer Park Shell-PEMEX refin-
ery at the Houston Shipping Channel in Texas, which processes heavy Maya crude imported 
from Mexico and exports products back to the Mexican market.”); Runnin’ Down a Dream, 
Part 3 - Mexico’s Plan to Revive their Crude Oil Refining Sector | RBN Energy, , 
https://rbnenergy.com/runnin-down-a-dream-part-3-mexicos-plan-to-revive-their-crude-
oil-refining-sector (last visited Jul 25, 2020). (“Mexico’s refineries are relatively simple — that 
is, not complex — and configured to process lighter, sweeter crudes, the exact quality that’s 
getting harder and harder to come by in Mexico.”); Mexico to tender new refinery by March: 
AMLO, (2018), https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/1808463-mexico-to-tender-new-
refinery-by-march-amlo (last visited Jul 25, 2020). (“Mexico’s existing refineries are designed 
to refine mostly light crude.”). 
53 International Energy Agency (IEA), supra note 44 at 23. (“The falling trajectory of oil pro-
duction and the steady rise in demand in the domestic market have squeezed the volumes of 
crude oil available for export: shipments fell to 1.2 mb/d in 2015 from a peak of 1.9 mb/d in 
2004. Mexico’s dependence on imports of refined products has also risen substantially: since 
2000, net imports of gasoline and diesel have almost tripled, most of which are furnished by 
refineries in the United States”). 
54 Christian Berthelsen & Lynn Cook, U.S. Loosens Longtime Ban on Oil Exports, WALL STREET 
JOURNAL, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-approves-limited-crude-oil-trade-to-mexico-
1439570613 (last visited Aug 3, 2020). (“The U.S. Commerce Department told members of 
Congress it intends to approve an application by the national oil company of Mexico to ex-
change heavy oil pumped there for light crude pumped in the U.S. … The swap deal with 
Mexico doesn’t need congressional approval. Such oil trades—which aren’t considered true 
exports because the U.S. is getting oil in return—were contemplated under the original ban 
legislation, but haven’t taken place before”). 
55 CONSOLIDATED APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2016, PUB. L. 114-113, (2015). 
56 International Energy Agency (IEA), supra note 44 at 23. (“Mexico’s dependence on imports 
of refined products has also risen substantially: since 2000, net imports of gasoline and diesel 
have almost tripled, most of which are furnished by refineries in the United States Mexico’s 
own refinery capacity has not kept pace with the increase in domestic product demand and, in 
addition, some of the existing capacity is not well adapted to process Mexico’s increasingly 
heavy crude slate.”).  
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and Mexico is poised to make North America a leading supplier of oil and 
gas.57 
Mexico also could benefit from increased import of U.S. shale technology 
and investment from fracking companies. Mexico has significant geological 
potential for more oil and gas production in its deepwater and unconventional 
oil and gas plays.58 The Burgos Basin is very similar to the adjacent Eagle Ford 
formation in the United States, which has been an important part of the Texas 
oil boom.59 Mexico’s rig count, which reflects active oil drilling crews, began 
to rise in 2018.60 Mexico has 21 billion barrels of recoverable onshore oil and 
20 billion barrels offshore.61 
The United States’ oil industry in and around the Gulf of Mexico has some 
of the world’s most advanced, extensive, and developed transport and pro-
cessing infrastructure. As a result, Texas oil processing facilities and pipelines 
in the Gulf of Mexico are in better position to process the crude that will soon 
 
 
57 Clare Ribando Seelke, Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations, 1 MEXICO: BACKGROUND AND 
U.S. RELATIONS 1–42, 28 (2020).; Clare Ribando Seelke, Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations, 
1 MEXICO: BACKGROUND AND U.S. RELATIONS 1–39, 27 (2021).(“Because of the [2013] re-
forms, Mexico has received more than $160 billion in promised investment. … Private sector 
trade, innovation, and investment have created a North American energy market that is inter-
dependent and multidirectional, with cross-border gas pipelines and liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) shipments from the United States to Mexico surging.”) 
58 Wood and Jeremy Martin, supra note 19 at 20. (“As the IEA’s recent assessment of Mexican 
oil confirms, the problem is not one of resource availability. There is no questioning Mexico’s 
geological potential, particularly in its underexplored deepwater and unconventional oil and 
gas plays”). 
59 Matthew Fry et al., What Happened to Mexico’s Burgos Shale?, SMU MISSION FOODS TEXAS- 
MEXICO CENTER 1, 2 (2020). (“As a coterminous geologic region, the Eagle Ford shale and 
the Burgos Basin share similar development histories”).  
60 Duncan Wood, Introduction: A reform years in the making, in MEXICO’S NEW ENERGY REFORM 
1–4, 2.(“And yet the reforms have brought about an extraordinary, rapid and profound liber-
alization. In the oil sector, we have witnessed the signing of more than 100 contracts for E&P, 
with a total future investment value of more than $160bn. In mid-2018, the rig count in Mexico 
began to rise for the first time in years. Pemex is now partnering with private and foreign firms 
in oil exploration and production, and has been allowed to farm out certain blocks entirely to 
private firms for a share of the profits”). 
61 International Energy Agency (IEA), supra note 44 at 63. (onshore reserves are mostly in the 
Tampico-Misantla Basin, including the Chicontepec field, and offshore reserves are in the 
Sureste Basin, including the Cantarell and Ku-Maloob-Zaap complexes). 
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be produced in the deepwater fields in Mexican territory in the Gulf of Mex-
ico.62 Gulf of Mexico crude tends to be heavy. U.S. Gulf Coast refineries are 
optimized to process heavy crude.63  
 
B. Electricity and Joint Export Capacity  
Turning to electricity generation, Mexico has enormous potential for 
growth in both wind and solar energy.64 Future efforts to expand production 
of wind power in the state of Tamaulipas, the center of Mexico’s wind re-
sources, would be most valuable if that power could be shipped north to cen-
ters of industrial and urban demand in Texas.65 Moreover, Mexico is building 
battery storage capacity for renewable energy in Mexicali Baja California that 
can serve as a backup power source for California’s grid.66  
Finally, together Mexico and Texas could become major exporters of liq-
uefied natural gas to the Asian markets.67 Rather than building a new pipeline 
through potentially hostile states such as California, it could be easier for Texas 
 
 
62 Guillermo J. Garcia Sanchez, Mexico’s Energy Reform and the 2012 U.S.-Mexico Transboundary 
Agreement: An Opportunity for Efficient, Effective and Safe Exploitation of the Gulf of Mexico, 9 SEA 
GRANT L. & POL’Y J. 1, 6–7 (2018). (“Finding answers to all of these challenges will not be an 
easy task for Mexico and the United States, particularly now that the industry is already oper-
ating in the region. On the U.S. side of the Gulf, operations have already begun in fields that 
could contain transboundary resources.  On the Mexican side, last December, the Ministry of 
Energy announced the fourth phase of the Energy Reforms. This new development consists 
of the tendering process of ten deep and ultra-deep water blocks in the Gulf.  Four of them 
are located in the Perdido Foldbelt, a geological area shared by both countries”). 
63 International Energy Agency (IEA), supra note 44 at 23. (“(“Mexico’s own refinery capacity 
has not kept pace with the increase in domestic product demand and, in addition, some of the 
existing capacity is not well adapted to process Mexico’s increasingly heavy crude slate”).  
64 Id. at 24. (“Mexico’s solar power potential is based on average daily irradiation of around 
5.5 kilowatt-hours per square metre (kWh/m2)(SENER, 2012), roughly double the levels seen 
in Germany.”). 
65 Texas has a far greater population than Tamaulipas or any of its bordering states. Binational 
Population Data in Sister Cities along the Rio Grande,  TCEQ , 
https://www.tceq.texas.gov/border/population.html (last visited Aug 10, 2020). There is 
growing industrial capacity along the border. Jesus Cañas, Roberto Coronado & Robert W 
Gilmer, Employment and Maquiladora Growth, TEXAS BORDER 27, 32 (2005).(“Mexico’s maqui-
ladora jobs are growing once more, beginning with the resumption of U.S. industrial expansion 
in mid-2003”). Also, wind power generally peaks in the hours before dawn, so it is rarely 
shipped West, where it would still be the middle of the night, the time of day with lowest 
power consumption. See Coleman, supra note 53 at 270.  
66 IENOVA already owns a cross-border transmission line that provides energy to California 
Independent System Operator (CAISO). IEnova, IFC Develop Large Battery Storage Project 
in Mexicali, , MEXICO BUSINESS , https://mexicobusiness.news/energy/news/ienova-ifc-de-
velop-large-battery-storage-project-mexicali (last visited Sep 3, 2021). 
67 México plantea exportar gas a Asia para resolver conflictos de ductos, (2020), https://es-
us.finanzas.yahoo.com/noticias/m%C3%A9xico-plantea-exportar-gas-asia-155053958.html 
(last visited Feb 15, 2021). 
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producers to use the existing infrastructure South of the border, including 
pipelines and terminals, to transport the overproduction in the Texas fields 
and sell them in the Asian markets.68 Ironically, as mentioned before Texas 
producers might find less regulatory and logistical barriers in Mexican territory 
than trying to access the U.S. pacific coast through New Mexico, Arizona and 
California. Mexico’s energy infrastructure is regulated at the federal level and 
Mexico’s government might be eager for new infrastructure that could boost 
Mexico’s energy exports, which have faltered along with stagnant domestic oil 
production.   
 
IV. OBSTACLES TO TEXAS-MEXICO ENERGY INTEGRATION 
 
The advantages for an energy integrated region are clear. Yet there is a 
growing danger that new energy laws and a missed opportunity to update re-
gional energy trade will frustrate these trade policies by cutting growing Texas 
energy production off from growing energy demand in Mexico. Mexico is tak-
ing steps to reverse its energy reform, close the country off to foreign invest-
ment, and reduce its energy imports.69 And in the United States, new move-
ments against the use of eminent domain for export projects and against all 
fossil fuel infrastructure threaten to strand U.S. energy producers and choke 
off Mexican consumers access to new fuel supplies. Finally, NAFTA and the 
USMCA now appear to be failed opportunities to update regional energy trade 
laws to protect international energy trade. 
 
A. Growing Barriers to Energy Investment in Mexico 
 
President Lopez Obrador’s moves to re-nationalize the oil and gas sector 
are making U.S. energy companies increasingly skeptical of investing in the 
future of Texas-Mexico energy trade.70 Notwithstanding the reforms of 2013, 
 
 
68 California’s Sempra Energy is the first company to explore this possibility. The projects 
have gone through different stages and initially the Mexican government was reluctant to pro-
vide export permits to the company. See Sempra Looking to Add Second LNG Project on 
Mexico’s West Coast, , NATURAL GAS INTELLIGENCE (2021), https://www.naturalgasin-
tel.com/sempra-looking-to-add-second-lng-project-on-mexicos-west-coast/ (last visited Sep 
6, 2021). 
69  Megan Rollag, Future of cross-border pipeline projects in AMLO’s Mexico: what’s the risk?, (2020) 
13 (1): 58 J WORLD ENERGY LAW BUS.  
70 See Garcia Sanchez, supra note 21 at 36. 
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President Lopez Obrador has a substantial control of the energy sector.71 Un-
der the Mexican constitution the Executive power appoints the energy regula-
tors, the National Hydrocarbon Commission and the Energy Commission; the 
Ministry of Energy can halt future public auctions for the E&P sector and has 
control over energy export permits; finally, the state-owned companies, 
PEMEX and CFE, have representatives appointed by the President in the 
board of directors and the heads of the companies.72 President Obrador has 
not been shy in exercising his constitutional powers to impact the implemen-
tation of the energy reform, and in some circumstances, backtrack the ad-
vancements initiated by previous administrations to increase private participa-
tion, competition, and integrate further with the U.S.73  
Examples of President Obrador’s efforts to negatively impact the imple-
mentation of the energy reform include new policies in the electricity sector 
forcing U.S. contractors to renegotiate transboundary pipeline deals signed 
during the Energy Reform.74  In May 2020, Mexico’s energy ministry enacted 
new rules that limit private participation in the power generation market, par-
ticularly those in the renewable sector, and increase the amount state utility 
generation.75 
In the E&P sector, President Lopez Obrador cancelled all planned new 
auctions for the development of shale fields in the north of Mexico and of 
deepwater fields in the Gulf. Moreover, the Ministry of Energy modified the 
rules applicable to the export permits granted under the energy reform, re-
stricting the ports of export of hydrocarbon products for private companies.76 
The rule provides a strategic advantage to PEMEX, since private parties are 
limited now to a number of exporting points as opposed to using the most 
 
 
71 Id. at 36. (“The second and perhaps the biggest weakness of the reform was the designers’ 
inability to surpass the legal culture that surrounds Mexico’s tradition of hyper-presidentialism. 
Mexican presidentialism tends to consolidate state power in the president as the central figure 
in determining public policy, as opposed to relying on independent agencies to control the key 
policy decisions in their assigned areas of oversight”). 
72 Id. 
73 Duncan Wood, An Uncertain Future: The Energy Sector under AMLO, in MEXICO’S NEW EN-
ERGY REFORM 164–68, 164 (2018). Garcia Sanchez, supra note 21 at 42.(“If the Peña Nieto 
administration had included everything in the text of the constitution, the available alternative 
for the detractors would be to fight for a constitutional amendment. However, with the 
adopted legal architecture, a new president could argue that the existing contracts violate the 
spirit of the constitution because, as he or she understands it, the terms are closer to the ones 
of a concession. Hence, the new president would not need to amend the constitution to chal-
lenge the existing contractual architecture of the reform”). 
74 Rollag, supra note 70. 
75 Jude Webber, Mexico Rams Through Electricity Market Overhaul, FINANCIAL TIMES, (May 15, 
2020) https://www.ft.com/content/da6e5abd-b1b5-497f-9fff-f7c131c81b27    
76 Jude Webber, Is third time the charm for AMLO’s energy reforms?, MEXICO NEWS DAILY (2021), 
https://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/analysis/is-third-time-the-charm-for-amlos-energy-re-
forms/ (last visited Sep 3, 2021). 
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cost efficient and closer one to export  markets.77 Moreover, the Ministry of 
Energy issued determinations favoring PEMEX in unitization processes in the 
Zama field off the Gulf coast over the technical and financial advantages of 
private actors.78 The precedent of the Zama field shows that the Ministry is 
willing to discriminate against private companies and provide the state-owned 
company an unfair advantage in the E&P sector.79  
Now, the fact that Mexico is undergoing a process of re-centralization of 
its energy policies, as opposed to prioritizing competition and maximizing 
state-rents, does not necessarily mean that integration opportunities with the 
U.S. are out of the question.80 To the contrary, as long as the government’s 
priorities are met, reaching a politically respectable level of energy sovereignty, 
there are strategies in which U.S. companies could reach agreements with the 
State-owned companies. As this paper shows, the North American energy sec-
tors are already interdependent but under the new Mexican energy policies the 
state-owned companies and the Ministry of Energy have to be at the center of 
the interdependence as opposed to the market. 
 
B. Growing Barriers to Energy Investment in the United States 
 
The United States is seeing growing movements against energy transport 
infrastructure and especially against the use of eminent domain that could pre-
vent construction of new pipelines & powerlines between Texas and México.81 




78 Mary Anastasia O’Grady, Opinion | Showdown in Mexico’s Zama Oil Field, WALL STREET JOUR-
NAL, June 27, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/showdown-in-mexicos-zama-oil-field-
11624823865 (last visited Aug 27, 2021). 
79 Under the Energy reform, when a unitization negotiation fails among operators, the Ministry 
of Energy has the power to decide who the operator of the field will be but it has to be based 
on the financial and technical capability of the licensees that maximizes the recovery in an 
economically sustainable way.  
80 Under the energy reform the government has to maximize long-run state-rents. We argue 
that providing advantages to CFE or Pemex does not translate into a maximization of state-
rents. In fact, by allowing the government to pick the best partner for each project, as stipu-
lated by the energy reform, the government can efficiently maximize the rents. Forcing the 
state to award fields or buy electricity from state owned companies can create losses because 
of their lack of efficiency and technical and financial capabilities. In other words, it is not clear 
that in every circumstance the state will maximize rents by providing advantages to the state-
owned entities.  
81 James W. Coleman & Alexandra B. Klass, Energy and Eminent Domain, 104 MINN. L. REV. 
659, 655, 716 (2019). (“This Part then suggests ways that policymakers can use eminent do-
main laws to either support or prevent different types of energy transport projects”). (“The 
owner may attempt to hold out for the entire economic surplus from the infrastructure pro-
posal, so this bilateral monopoly raises transaction costs and may entirely prevent construction 
of efficient projects”). 
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in oil, gas, and renewable energy production requires more pipelines and 
power-lines. But cleaner energy sources are particularly dependent on new lin-
ear infrastructure. 82 Coal and oil built the modern world in part because they 
are relatively easy to transport and store—they can be moved by truck, ship, 
or rail. By contrast, cleaner burning natural gas can only be moved by expensive 
pipelines or by even more expensive liquefied natural gas facilities.83 And elec-
tricity from cleaner sources such as wind, solar, and geothermal can only reach 
customers through powerlines. The “financial fate” of new energy production 
depends on “affordable paths to market.”84  
But new legal challenges are emerging to this energy transport infrastruc-
ture just when it is most needed. First, both states and the federal government 
are increasingly asserting the right to block projects that have traditionally been 
approved by the other level of government. On one hand, the federal govern-
ment and the courts are insisting on wider federal environmental reviews of 
oil pipelines and powerlines, which have been traditionally approved by the 
states.85 Any substantial utility project will technically require federal permits 
for routine activities such as cross federal waters, which include any tributaries 
of navigable waters. The federal government historically has not required an 
individualized process for the innumerable permits required to cross every 
anonymous backyard creek. But in recent years, the federal government, some-
times at the insistence of the federal courts, has been imposing more and more 
environmental review on these water-crossings. For example, since 2016 the 
Dakota Access pipeline has been stuck in litigation concerning the adequacy 
of the federal government’s review of its crossing of the Missouri River in 
North Dakota—in 2020 a federal court finally determined that these years of 
review had been inadequate and that the government would have to go back 
and do a full environmental impact statement to assess the pipeline’s river 
crossing. 
Almost all states grant eminent domain powers for energy infrastructure 
because linear infrastructure is so difficult to build if it can be killed by any 
 
 
82 Id. at 14. (“For years, oil companies focused on energy production: if oil could be produced, 
there would be a market for it. Of course, increased production has always required increased 
transport capacity to take new product to market. But in the past, this new production could 
often use the same pipelines and shipping routes used by previous producers”). 
83 Id. at 8. (“Virtually all states grant eminent domain authority to oil and gas companies by 
statute to build oil and gas pipelines and associated infrastructure and to electric utilities to 
build electric transmission 
lines”). 
84 Id. at 15. 
85 See id; James W. Coleman, Policymaking by Proposal: How Agencies Are Transforming Industry In-
vestment Long Before Rules Can Be Tested in Court, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 497, 512–14 (2017). 
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holdout landowner along an approved route.86 Gas pipelines that obtain a cer-
tificate from the national energy regulator, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC), are also granted eminent domain authority.87 The United 
States has a bifurcated system for approving pipelines.88 U.S. Senators recently 
introduced a bill to ban the use of eminent domain for export projects.89 And 
pipeline and power-line opponents have increasingly brought challenges to 
projects designed to export energy from the state, arguing that if the project is 
meant to serve consumers in other states it must not be serving the exporting 
state’s interest.90 
The U.S. is also seeing a raft of proposals to ban future federal permits 
for U.S. oil and gas projects which could, if adopted, prevent new pipelines 
between Texas and Mexico. Anti-fossil fuel advocates are increasingly asking 
for government intervention to limit the ability to produce, move, and burn 
fossil fuels.91 Pipelines between Texas and Mexico will have to go through the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process.92 Pipelines may be re-
jected if they are “perceived as enabling further emissions globally.”93  
 
 
86 James W. Coleman, The Jurisdictional Anticommons in Getting to Yes on Linear Infrastructure 
Projects, Macdonald-Laurier Institute (2021). Coleman and Klass, supra note 69 at 716-18. 
87 Id. at 8. (“Likewise, nearly a century ago, Congress granted nationwide eminent domain 
authority to interstate natural gas pipelines that obtain a Certificate of Public Convenience and 
Necessity from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (‘FERC’)”). States have tried to 
use conservation easements plus their sovereign immunity to resist federally-authorized emi-
nent domain but that gambit was rejected in a controversial 5-4 Supreme Court decision in 
2021. Penneast Pipeline Company, LLC v. New Jersey et al., No. 19-1039 (June 29, 2021). 
88 Id. at 16.  
89 Erik Neuman, Oregon’s US senators seek to restrict eminent domain for gas pipelines, OPB (2020), 
https://www.opb.org/article/2020/08/17/oregons-us-senators-seek-to-restrict-eminent-do-
main-for-gas-pipelines/ (last visited Sep 3, 2020). 
90 James W. Coleman, Eminent Domain for Exporting Energy, Energy Law Professor Blog, 
https://www.energylawprof.com/?p=1025 (June 3, 2019).  
91 Coleman and Klass, supra note 82 at 17. (“By contrast, the primary advocacy groups oppos-
ing fossil fuel energy projects come from the other end of the political spectrum. They advo-
cate broad government intervention in the energy economy to protect the environment by 
(among other things) limiting the ability to burn fossil fuels. The energy project opponents 
generally favor government action on behalf of the public interest over private rights…As 
energy companies have rushed to build new natural gas pipelines, some plaintiffs have argued 
that, as private companies, pipeline companies should have to make a stronger showing that 
their proposals are in the public interest”). 
92 NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT, , 42 U.S.C. § 4322 (B)-(C) (2017).  
93 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, RECORD OF DECISION AND 
NATIONAL INTEREST DETERMINATION, 29, 
http://www.energylawprof.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/01/KeystoneXL.Record-of-
Decision. pdf. (last visited Nov 3, 2015). (“While the proposed Project by itself is unlikely to 
significantly impact the level of GHG-intensive extraction of oil sands crude or the continued 
demand for heavy crude oil at refineries in the United States to prioritize actions that are not 
perceived as enabling further GHG emissions globally”). 
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There is also a widespread and growing movement to challenge energy 
transport projects in the individual U.S. states.94 Many argue that transport 
projects should be rejected if they will increase oil production up or down 
stream.95 California recently passed a bill to forbid new oil and gas pipelines 
on state property, making it virtually impossible to build new pipelines across 
the state.96 
C. Missed Opportunities for International Agreements on 
Energy Integration 
 
When formal renegotiations began in the spring of 2017, many observers 
believed that the 1994 NAFTA required an update.97 The emergence of new 
technologies, the need to include new labor and environmental regulations, the 
ringfencing of the North American partners from Chinese competition, and 
the new realities of the energy sector, were factors that the three nations were 
looking forward to address.98 Many of these needed updates were already in 
the text of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) that was negotiated by the 
Obama administration a year earlier with eleven other partners.99 However, 
 
 
94 Coleman, supra note 53 at 6. (“Despite the delays and contradictions surrounding the State 
Department’s rejection of Keystone XL, an increasingly powerful global movement is taking 
it as a model, looking to expand it to all state and federal environmental assessments and to 
export this Keystone XL precedent to other projects and countries. Some of these cases, such 
as the Dakota Access Pipeline, have attracted widespread and sustained attention. But the 
movement is much broader, raising challenges to a wide range of energy transport projects 
across the nation: gas pipelines, coal export terminals, and liquefied natural gas facilities.”) 
95 Id. at 7. (“Scholars and environmental organizations argue that, from this point forward, all 
state and federal environmental reviews of new fossil fuel transport projects must consider 
whether they could increase fuel production upstream of the project or increase fuel consump-
tion downstream of the project”). 
96 Associated Press, Gov. Newsom Signs Law to Prevent Building Pipelines on State Property, KTLA, 
October 12, 2019, https://ktla.com/news/local-news/gov-newsom-signs-law-to-prevent-
building-pipelines-on-state-property/ (last visited Sep 3, 2020). 
97 Renegotiating NAFTA: What should the priorities be?, , ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE , 
https://www.epi.org/publication/renegotiating-nafta-what-should-the-priorities-be/ (last 
visited Sep 6, 2021); What the U.S., Canada and Mexico Want From a New NAFTA, , US 
NEWS & WORLD REPORT , //www.usnews.com/news/articles/2017-08-16/what-the-us-can-
ada-and-mexico-want-from-a-new-nafta (last visited Sep 6, 2021); NAFTA Works – For the 
U.S. and U.S. Energy, supra note 22. 
98 A Really Big Button that Doesn’t Do Anything? The ‘Anti-China Clause’ in US Trade Agree-
ments by Geraldo Vidigal :: SSRN, , https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=3377492 (last visited Sep 20, 2021). 
99 David Gantz, The USMCA: Updating NAFTA by Drawing on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Baker 
Institute for Public Policy at Rice University, Report ( February, 2020), available at 
https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/ab609023/bi-report-022120-mex-usmca-
8.pdf;  
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President Donald Trump’s campaign-promise to abandon the TPP and rene-
gotiate NAFTA forced the partners to update their trade relationship through 
a trilateral negotiation as opposed to benefit from the multilateral trade agree-
ment negotiated a year earlier. Canada and Mexico remained partners in the 
TPP.100  
From the outset, the NAFTA renegotiation used the TPP as a template. 101 
Hence many of the “new” articles in the USMCA resemble the TPP, and in 
the protection of foreign investments, due to the most-favored-nation clause, 
complement each other. 102  In the USMCA, however, the energy sector is 
treated distinctively. As opposed to including a chapter that would foster a 
deeper North American integration the USMCA adopted a series of provisions 
that reinforce Mexican nationalism, gives some limited protection to existing 
investments, and pushed Canada and the U.S. to agree to side letters to regulate 
their energy trade.103 Without doubt, it was a failed opportunity to recognize 
the potential of North America as an energy integrated region.  
 
1.  USMCA Hydrocarbons Chapter 
 
USMCA’s Chapter 8 title is called “Recognition of the United Mexican 
State’s Direct, Inalienable, and Imprescriptible Ownership of Hydrocar-
bons.”104 The Chapter begins by recognizing that the Parties fully respect the 
“sovereignty and their sovereign right to regulate” the energy sector “in ac-
cordance with their respective Constitutions and domestic laws, in the full ex-
ercise of their democratic processes.”105 It did, however, maintain the promise 
to respect the investor protections for energy companies that had invested 
during the energy reform.106 
 
 
100 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership art. 1, Mar. 8, 
2018, https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/cptpp/Pages/comprehensive-
and-progressive-agreement-for-trans-pacific-partnership.aspx. [hereinafter CTPP/TPP] 
101 Garcia Sanchez, supra note 11 at 26–28; David A Gantz, The United States-Mexico-Canada 
Agreement: Energy Production and Policies, RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC 
POLICY 1 (2019). 
102  Id. 
103 Canada-U.S. Side Letter on Energy, available at https://ustr.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/files/agreements/FTA/USMCA/Text/CA-US_Side_Letter_on_Energy.pdf 
104 USMCA Chapter 8 
105 Id. 
106 The Chapter states that the sovereign rights over their natural resources is done “without 
prejudice to their [U.S. and Canada’s] rights and remedies available under this Agreement [US-
MCA].” Chapter 8 of the USMCA. 
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Chapter 8 did not recognize anything new in terms of Mexico’s sovereign 
rights to regulate the extraction of its natural resources.107 In fact, Chapter 8 
reaffirms recognized customary international law on the sovereign power of 
any State to extract and regulate its resources.108 One only needs to look at 
Resolution 1803 of the United Nations General Assembly, voted 87 to 2, with 
twelve abstentions, declaring “the right of peoples and nations to permanent 
sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources” to be “exercised in the 
interest of their national development and of the well-being of the people of 
the State concerned.”109 Moreover, Resolution 1803 clarified that the explora-
tion, development and disposition of the resources “as well as the import of 
the foreign capital required for these purposes, should be in conformity with 
the rules and conditions which the peoples and nations freely consider to be 
necessary or desirable.”110 This widely accepted resolution, however, also rec-
ognized that if nationalization, expropriation, or requisitioning of the foreign 
investment in the sector takes place, it “shall be based on grounds or reasons 
of public utility, security or the national interests which are recognized as over-
riding purely individual or private interests [and] the owner shall be paid ap-
propriate compensation.”111 In sum, Chapter 8 of the USMCA only reaffirmed 
a recognized right of the State by international customary law.  
Chapter 8 cannot be construed as a general exception to Mexico’s treaty 
obligations.112 Exceptions in investment treaties can either have the intention 
of limiting the scope of the substantive treaty obligations or be available de-
fenses invoked to justify an unlawful conduct.113 The text in Chapter 8 has 
neither of those effects. By stipulating that Canada and the U.S. recognize 
 
 
107 Gantz, supra at 32, p. 3. (“The United States view is that Chapter 8 language essentially 
states the obvious: any sovereign state retains the rights to change its constitution and laws, 
even if such changes may incur international responsibility to treaty partners.”) 
108 United Nations resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural resources, U.N.G.A. 
Res. 1803 (XVII), 2 I.L.M/ 223 (1963). [hereinafter UN General Assembly Resolution 1803]; 
see also for resources located in the continental shelf and the seabed, United Nations Con-
vention on the Laws of the Seas arts. 55-57, Dec. 10, 1982, 1883 U.N.T.S. 31363; and Con-
vention on the Continental Shelf art 1. Apr. 29, 1958, 499 U.N.T.S. 311. ; see also Art. 18, 
Energy Charter Treaty (The same principle reflect in Chapter 8 of the USMCA is integrated 
in Article 18 of the Energy Charter Treaty entitles “Sovereignty over Energy Resources” where 
it states that “the contracting Parties recognize state sovereignty and sovereign right over en-
ergy resources. They reaffirm that these must be exercised in accordance with and subject to 
the rule of international law.”)  
109 Id. UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 
110 Id. 
111 Id.  
112 For analysis of how exception clauses are drafted in investment and trade agreements, see 
Caroline Henckels, Should Investment Treaties Contain Public Policy Exceptions, 59 B.C. L. 
REV. 2825 (2018) 
113 Id. 
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Mexico’s sovereign right to reform its constitution and the domestic legislation 
“without prejudice to their rights and remedies available under this Agree-
ment” the USMCA does not limit the scope of the rights recognized in the 
treaty. To the contrary, the agreement reaffirms the scope of the substantive 
treaty obligations regardless of Mexico’s “sovereign right.” General exceptions 
in other treaties specifically use language such as “nothing in this Agreement 
shall be construed to prevent the adoption of…”.114 Other treaties use carve-
out to exempt certain sectors or policy areas from the treaty (such as NAFTA 
1994 did), or specifically carve out the application of investment rights, such 
as national treatment or most-favored nation treatment, by saying that such 
treatment “do not apply to … procurement by a Party or a state enterprise…,” 
(NAFTA 1108(7)) (another example is Article 22 of the investment chapter of 
the Australia Singapore FTA that provides “[n]o claim may be brought … in 
respect to a tobacco control measure of a Party.”). Finally, other treaties have 
specific reservations to treaties by stipulating that certain obligations, such as 
establishment or non-discriminatory treatment of investments, “do not apply 
to a measure with respect to [X service or industries]” (Articles 8.2(3) and 
9.2(2)(b) and (C) of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement be-
tween Canada and the EU. 
Chapter 8’s recognition of the sovereign right to develop natural resources 
served more as a political statement to conciliate the incoming Mexican ad-
ministration views on the need to achieve “energy sovereignty”.115 In that 
unique view of the energy sector, the State-owned companies should receive 
priority privileges over private actors in order to ensure the capacity of the 
State to exercise control over the extraction, production, and transformation 
of energy resources. 
 
2. The USMCA and the Protection of Energy Investments.  
 
One of the most striking changes in North American investment protec-
tion was the erosion of the investment protection chapter in the USMCA.116 
NAFTA’s Chapter 11 provided for a series of protection to North American 
investors against adverse government interference and for a national and 
“nondiscriminatory treatment” (with the exception of the energy sector in 
Mexico as explained above).  If those protections were ignored, American, Ca-
nadian, and Mexican investors had a right to bring specific claims against the 
 
 
114 Id. at 2828. 
115 See supra Section IV.A. 
116 Isaac Olson, New Challenges to Transboundary Unitization in the Gulf of Mexico, 6 TEXAS A&M 
JOURNAL OF PROPERTY LAW 109–111 (2020). 
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governments to international investment arbitral tribunals. The USMCA mod-
ified the basic structure of the system. 117 
The USMCA first eliminated the arbitration proceedings from the Canada-
U.S. relationship.118 Under the USMCA Canadian or American investors af-
fected by actions taken by the respective governments of their neighboring 
nation do not have access to an international arbitral dispute resolution mech-
anism.119 They are left with only two options: convince their governments to 
initiate a State-State proceeding under chapter 31 or bring a claim under U.S. 
domestic courts to resolve any dispute against the host governments.120 The 
exclusion of the investor-state dispute resolution mechanism was a clear con-
sequence from the Trump’s presidency’s view that the U.S. government should 
not be in the “business” of promoting and protecting American investments 
abroad.121 If American companies wanted to build plants outside of the U.S. 
they had to assume a risk. To the Trump administration the goal of the gov-
ernment should be to bring investments back to the U.S. instead of making it 
easier for them to take their capital abroad. In their view one of the cata-
strophic consequences of the stablished U.S. trade policies was the promotion 
of American investment abroad instead of the safeguarding of existing invest-
ment in the U.S.122 The exclusion of the dispute resolution mechanisms for 
Canadian investment was also consistent with “anti-global judges” sentiment 
of some conservative groups in the U.S. In their conception, world 
judges/courts should not be in a position to tell the U.S. government what it 
can or cannot do in terms of its national interest.123  
In a surprising turn of events, Mexico held its grounds in favor of provid-
ing investors an international dispute resolution mechanism. Faith in interna-
tional tribunals did not come from a fear that Mexican investors could be af-
fected in the U.S., but out of the Pena Nieto advisor’s views that investors 
were afraid that the “structural reforms” in Mexico could be amended if a more 
left oriented government could take office. According to news reports at the 
 
 
117 M Angeles Villarreal & Fergusson, Ian F., NAFTA and the United States-Mexico-Canada Agree-
ment (USMCA), CRS.GOV , https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44981.pdf.  
118 USMCA Chapter 14 Annex 14-C 
119 Id. 
120 Chapter 31 of the USMCA, Dispute Settlement. 
121 Offshore Jobs to Mexico at Your Own Risk - WSJ, , 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/offshoring-isds-usmca-nafta-keystone-
11626460641?mod=article_inline (last visited Aug 30, 2021). 
122 Id. 
123 One of the oldest published views from the American conservative establishment against 
international courts and tribunals is present in Robert H. Bork’s book “coercing Virtue: the 
Worldwide Rule of Judges” were he critiques international courts “activism” and characterizes 
them as a threat to national sovereignty.  
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time, the Peña Nieto administration believed that without including a specific 
mechanism to redress investors complains against actions taken by future gov-
ernments, foreign investors would not invest in the recently opened sectors, 
primarily in energy and telecommunications. The fears were confirmed by a 
series of comments from the industry, specifically the American Petroleum 
Institute, that publicly requested the U.S. to include some type of investor-
state dispute settlement mechanism because eliminating it would “undermine 
U.S. energy security, investment protections and our global energy leader-
ship.”124 As such, Mexico was willing to have a Chapter to allow claims be-
tween U.S. investors and the Mexican government, and a specific annex that 
would cover certain government contracts in covered sectors. In other words, 
they were willing to submit themselves to international tribunals in order to 
guarantee energy investors that they would be protected by international fo-
rums in case the government changed its energy or telecommunications poli-
cies.  The result was the adoption of articles 14 D and 14 E of the USMCA.  
Chapter 14 initially recovered most of the text of NAFTA’s Chapter 11, 
except for a couple of clarifications on substantive rights to the investors. For 
example, the USMCA has specific clarifications on what national treatment 
and most-favored national treatment means. According to the USMCA, when 
determining expropriation claims and whether national treatment was af-
forded, a “like circumstances” test is required. According to Article 14.4.4 a 
“like circumstances … depends on the totality of the circumstances including 
whether the relevant treatment distinguishes between investors or investments 
on the basis of legitimate public welfare objectives.”125 Another standard that 
was clarified in the treaty was the “minimum standard of treatment” to foreign 
investors. The USMCA defined the standard as the “customary international 
law minimum standard of treatment of aliens” which includes fair and equita-
ble treatment and full protection of security. The standard, however, does not 
require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required under cus-
tomary international law nor it creates “additional substantive rights.”126 For 
further clarification, the USMCA specifies that fair and equitable treatment 
“includes the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil, or administrative 
adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process em-
bodied in the principal legal systems of the world.”127 The treaty also clarifies 
 
 
124 American Petroleum Institute (API), API Supports NAFTA Modernization that Retains Strong 
Protections for U.S. Investors, February 20, 2017, http://www.api.org/news-policy-and-is-
sues/news/2018/02/20/api-supports-nafta-modernization-that-protect-us-investors.   
125 USMCA Article 14.5.4. 
126 USMCA Article 14.6.2 
127 USMCA Article 14.6.2(a) 
FUTURE OF NORTH AMERICAN ENERGY TRADE 
30 
that full protection and security “requires each party to provide the level of 
police protection required under customary international law.128 
In addition, Article 14.6(4) clarifies that an action taken by the government 
that “may be inconsistent with an investor’s expectations does not constitute 
a breach.”129 In the same spirit, Article 14.16 states that “[n]othing” in the in-
vestment Chapter of the USMCA shall be construed as preventing the govern-
ments from adopting environmental, health, safety or other regulatory actions 
that they “consider appropriate.”130 These clarifications are a game changer in 
general when it comes to challenges from investors that might argue in courts 
for the recovery of damages for governmental actions that might affect their 
legitimate expectations.  
Now when it comes to general U.S.-Mexico claims, Article 14-D narrows 
the type of claims that can be brought to international arbitration. Under the 
USMCA indirect expropriation and breach of fair and equitable treatment are 
excluded from the mechanism.131 In contrast with NAFTA’s fork in the road 
provision, in the USMCA U.S.-Mexico general investment proceedings local 
remedies must be exhausted as a precondition to bring claims to international 
arbitral panels.132 These exclusions, however, are not included in the dispute 
resolution mechanism available for investors who signed contracts with gov-
ernment entities.  
According to Annex 14-E on Mexico-United States Investment Disputes 
Related to Government Contracts claimants who fall under the category of 
“covered sectors” do maintain a series of grounds against the Mexican gov-
ernment. Covered sectors include specifically “activities with respect to oil and 
gas … such as exploration, extraction, refining, transportation, distribution, or 
sale”, and the supply to the public on behalf of the State of power generation, 
telecommunication, and transportation services. For these set of investors, the 
USMCA expands the ground available to them including national treatment, 
most-favored nation treatment minimum standard of treatment (including fair 
and equitable and full protection and security), non-discriminatory treatment 
in case of armed conflict or civil strife; and direct and indirect or regulatory 
expropriation. The treaty, however, does clarify that any “unilateral act of an 
administrative or judicial authority, such as a permit, license, certificate, ap-
proval, or similar instrument” issues by the government in its “regulatory ca-
 
 
128 USMCA Article 14.6.2(b) 
129 USMCA Article 14.6.4 
130 USMCA Article 14.16  
131 14-D-2 
132 14-D-5. 
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pacity” shall not be considered an agreement signed with the government sub-
ject to the protection of Chapter 14-E.133 Only those written agreements be-
tween a national authority and a covered investor  that grants rights to develop 
the investment shall be considered as “covered government contracts.”134 
Now, by recognizing the most favored nation treatment to investors in the 
energy sector, the Mexico pledge to afford U.S. investors treatment that is no 
more restrictive than the treatment it grants to nationals of other trade or in-
vestment agreements. That is, Mexico has to grant U.S. energy companies the 
same protections it gives to its other energy investment partners. This is fur-
ther clarified in the USMCA Article 32.11 (“Specific Provisions on Cross-Bor-
der Trade in Services, Investment, and State-Owned Enterprises and Desig-
nated Monopolies for Mexico”). The Article specifically states that Mexico re-
serves the right to adopt or maintain a measure in the energy sector “only to 
the extent consistent with the least restrictive measure that Mexico may adopt 
or maintain under the terms of applicable reservations and exceptions to par-
allel obligations in other trade and investment agreements that Mexico has rat-
ified prior to entry into force of this agreement, including the WTO agreement, 
without regard to whether those other agreements have entered into force.”135 
Here is where the CPTPP/TPP text becomes relevant for purposes of energy 
investment protections under the USMCA. What article 32.11 did was to inte-
grate the investment protections afforded to that sector from the CPTPP/TPP 
into the USMCA.136  
If the CTPP/TPP would have included a similar provision as Chapter 8 of 
the USMCA, Article 32.11 would have been irrelevant. In the CTPP/TPP, 
however, Mexico included a list of reservations connected to the energy sec-
tor.137 In Annex I-Mexico-17 to 26, Mexico specified that it would not take 
more restrictions to the sector than the ones afforded under the Mexican En-
ergy reform of 2013.138 In other words, the Pena Nieto administration pledge 
to maintain the regulatory and legislative framework in place when it signed 
and ratified the CTTPP/TPP, making sure that future government could not 
take more restrictive rules. The CTTPP/TPP internationalized the energy re-
form of 2013, and then the USMCA included it by reference to the 
CTTPP/TPP most favored nation clause.  
 
 
133 USMCA Article 14-E-2(d), footnote 34 
134 USMCA Article 14-E-2(a) 
135 USMCA Article 32.11 
136 Gantz, supra note 23, at 4. 
137 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership Annexes I, II 
and IV, Mar. 8, 2018, https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-
force/cptpp/Pages/comprehensive-and-progressive-agreement-for-trans-pacific-partner-
ship.aspx. [hereinafter CTPP/TPP] 
138 Id. 
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Hence, under a comprehensive construction of Chapter 8, Mexico set the 
Energy reform of 2013 as the ground floor for its relations with hydrocarbon 
related investor. Mexico did specify that it reserves its right to regulate its hy-
drocarbons according to the Mexican constitution, but it did so without prej-
udice to the rights afforded to investors in the USMCA. And, through Article 
32.11, Mexico recognized that any changes that might be considered more re-
strictive to the ones in the energy reform of 2013, would infringe on the inves-
tor’s rights. Mexico did not give away its rights to regulate the sector, but it did 
pledge to not enact a more restrictive framework than the one passed in 2013.  
 
V. BUILDING U.S.-MEXICO ENERGY TRADE 
 
Energy law changes in the United States and Mexico too often ignore 
the impact they may have on energy trade. Thus far, there has been almost no 
academic or policy discussion on how changes to eminent domain or federal 
permitting could divide Texas and Mexico—in part because press coverage 
and test cases have tended to focus on energy trade between the United States 
and Canada. 
It is high time to set an agenda for legal reform to realize the full po-
tential of Texas-Mexico energy trade. The USMCA was a missed opportunity 
to force governments to integrate further and restrain some of the local U.S. 
restrictive policies. But this is not the end of the story. First, whatever the new 
regulatory barriers, the economic gravity of these two crucial energy markets 
will keep pulling their markets together—when disparate policies and trade 
barriers mean different prices on each side of the border, that will simply in-
crease the rewards for companies able to surmount the barriers to cross-border 
trade. Second, now is the moment to lay out the terms of a new energy treaty 
that could be adopted to gain the full potential benefit of cross-border trade. 
NAFTA and its renegotiation have made plain that opportunities for cross-
border trade agreements are both precious and fleeting. When the next oppor-
tunity emerges, it is crucial that there are policy proposal already on the shelf 
to provide the backbone of a new energy agreement.  
 
A. Roadblocks to Cross-Border Energy Trade Will Merely 
Create Different Cross-Border Trade Opportunities 
 
Even in the face of new regulatory roadblocks and nationalistic policies 
there are still avenues to mutually beneficial energy trade because the economic 
fundamentals and the geological and geographic characteristics are there. First, 
roadblocks in one country are opportunities for the neighbor. You can use 
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your trading partner to avoid regulatory issues on your side of the border. (Ex-
ample, pipelines in Mexico to export natural gas to Asia; climate change 
pledges on the U.S. side and renewable energy built on the Mexican side) 
Second, distances matter. Energy commodities, infrastructure, and re-
sources on one side of the border might be closer to high demand urban areas 
or adequate exports points across the border than the ones in your own terri-
tory. For example, gas fields in Texas can feed combined cycle natural gas 
power plants in North Mexico. Renewable energy storage capacity in Baja Cal-
ifornia is available to serve the power-hungry California market.139 And U.S. 
refineries in Houston and Gulf of Mexico are natural destinations for growing 
production in Mexican offshore oil fields.140  
Third, different sectors of the energy market can still do business under 
nationalistic views, as long as they are willing to play under new rules. For 
example, Mexico’s policy changes giving advantage to PEMEX and CFE are 
opportunities for services providers willing to work with the companies under 
their terms; another example is Shell’s sale of the Dear Park refinery to 
PEMEX to strengthen Mexico’s “energy sovereignty”. 
International treaties serve as mechanisms to force states to blame inter-
national commitments on policies that are politically complicated to imple-
ment domestically. This treaty mechanism is particularly indispensable because 
the barriers to strengthening U.S.-Mexico energy trade are not solely the result 
of energy nationalism or autarkic political instincts. In many ways they are 
driven by important domestic concerns that will naturally dominate if the im-
portance of international trade is not prioritized.  
 
B. An Agenda for North American Energy Integration 
 
As noted, there are different levels and instruments for integrating energy 
markets. Some require formal treaty formation, others could be integrated into 
side trade letters, and would demand joint policymaking through high level 
dialogue or commissions. Using the Energy Charter Treaty, the U.S.-Canada 
Side Letters on Energy, NAFTA’s Energy Chapter, the U.S.-Canada Transit 
Pipeline Treaty, the U.S.-Mexico Agreement for the Exploitation of Trans-
 
 
139 IEnova, IFC Develop Large Battery Storage Project in Mexicali, supra note 67. 
140 Crude oil inputs to Mexico’s petroleum refineries continued to decline in 2018 - Today in 
Energy - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), , https://www.eia.gov/to-
dayinenergy/detail.php?id=39972 (last visited Sep 7, 2021). (According to the EIA report 
“U.S. refineries along the Gulf Coast are able to process heavy Mexican crude oil blends with 
a higher yield of finished, low-sulfur motor gasoline.”) 
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boundary Hydrocarbons as references we propose the following energy inte-
gration principles to set an agenda for future U.S.-Mexico negotiations toward 
North American energy cooperation.141  
Non-Discriminatory Access to energy infrastructure and freedom of energy transit. Both 
countries should adopt clear rules that give the partner country companies ac-
cess to existing infrastructure, including transit-related infrastructure, and 
should not prevent companies from building new capacity in case the existing 
transit infrastructure is insufficient.142 The guiding principles should be free-
dom of transit and a duty not to impose unreasonable restrictions or charges, 
including making sure that energy transit flows are not disrupted even in light 
of disputes among nations.143 These principles could build upon the 1977 Pipe-
line Transit Treaty between the United States and Canada but apply more 
broadly to all three countries, to transport of electricity and other energy prod-
ucts, and to import and export of energy products.144 In the same vein, any 
fees, charges, or permits set up to allow the access to existing energy infra-
structure should be set up in a non-discriminatory and transparent way.145 At 
 
 
141 Agreement Concerning Transboundary Hydrocarbon Reservoirs in the Gulf of Mexico, 
U.S.-Mex., Feb. 20, 2012, T.I.A.S. No. 14-718, [hereinafter the U.S.-Mexico Hydrocarbons 
Transboundary Agreement] available at https://www.boem.gov/sites/default/files/regula-
tions/Treaties/US-Mexico-Transboundary-Reservoirs-Agreement.pdf 
142 Selivanova, supra note 32 at 397. (explaining the importance of energy transit under the 
ECT); the Energy Charter Treaty regulates the principle of freedom of transit in Article 7 
(“Each Contracting Party shall take the necessary measures to facilitate the Transit of Energy 
Materials and Products consistent with the principle of freedom of transit and without distinc-
tion as to the origin, destination or ownership of such Energy materials and Products or dis-
crimination as to pricing on the basis of such distinctions, and without imposing any unrea-
sonable, delays, restrictions or charges.”); the U.S.-Canada Side Letter on Energy also contem-
plated access to electric transmission facilities and pipeline networks, see Art 5, U.S.-Canada 
Side Letter on Energy (specifying that the measures governing access to or the use of these 
facilities shall be “neither unduly discriminatory nor unduly preferential” and that any tolls, 
rates, or charges connected to the access are “just, reasonable, and neither unduly discrimina-
tory nor unduly preferential”) 
143 Id. at 397.; see also Article 7 of the Energy Charter Treaty. 
144 See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text. 
145 The Inter-governmental Agreement (IGA), the model treaty drafted by the Energy Charter 
Treaty Secretariat for states involved in transit cross border infrastructure, also contemplated 
principles involving “freedom of transit” and non-discriminatory, transparent regulations, see 
Article 6 and 7, Model Intergovernmental and Host Government Agreement for Cross-Border 
Pipelines, Second edition, available at https://www.energycharter.org/what-we-do/trade-
and-transit/model-agreements/ ; the same principles are contemplated in the Energy Charter 
Treaty Secretariat Model Agreements for Cross-Border Electricity Projects, see Sections  on 
Land rights, Transport of Electricity, Ownership of Transmission Rights With respect to Elec-
tricity in the Electricity Transmission Facility, and Non-Interruption of Project Activities, 
Model Intergovernmental and Host Government Agreements for Cross-Border Electricity 
Projects, released in 2011, available at https://www.energycharter.org/what-we-do/trade-
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a minimum, governments should not prevent or impede the cooperation 
among energy companies to allow access to and use of existing infrastruc-
ture.146   
Investment protection principles for North American energy companies. Both coun-
tries should adopt clear rules on expropriation and nationalization, including 
formulas for compensation that contemplate market values, rates of return, 
and formulas to estimate future prices.147 Moreover, there should be compen-
sation mechanisms beyond monetary compensation—for example, priority ac-
cess to future developments or projects. Moreover, both nations should rec-
ognize the importance of Mexican state-controlled entities and their invest-
ments in the U.S. The principles that protect foreign investment should also 
be available for Mexican state-owned enterprises that are currently subject to 
different regulatory standards in the U.S. Additionally, both governments 
should specify the level of civil liability and immunity that the state-owned 
companies from Mexico will have in U.S. territory. These state-controlled en-
tities, by being a central actor in Mexico’s energy sovereignty and the develop-
ment of North American energy resources, should have specific rules applica-
ble to them as opposed to standards applicable to other State-owned enter-
prises from other nations.  
 
 
and-transit/model-agreements/ see also, PETER D. CAMERON, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY IN-
VESTMENT LAW THE PURSUIT OF STABILITY 94–97 (2010). (discussing the different stability 
mechanisms available for cross-border infrastructure) 
146 This principle for example was established in Article 12 of the U.S. Mexico Hydrocarbons 
Transboundary Agreement for facilities near the delimitation line, see U.S.-Mexico Hydrocar-
bons Transboundary Agreements, art. 12, supra note 172. (“1. The Parties shall use their best 
efforts to facilitate cooperation between Licensees in activities related to the Exploration and 
Exploitation of a Transboundary Unit, including the facilitation of access to and use of Facil-
ities near the Delimitation Line, and shall not prevent or impede such cooperation by unrea-
sonable withholding necessary Permits. 2. The use of Facilities near the Delimitation Line may 
include, inter alia, access to and interconnection with a Pipeline and physical access to Pipeline 
capacity and, where appropriate, to Facilities supplying technical services incidental to such 
access. 3. The Parties shall facilitate, subject to their respective national law, access to Facilities 
for workers engaged in any activities related to a Transboundary Unit.”),  
147 CAMERON, supra note 27 at 26–35.(describing the different layers of legal instruments em-
ployed by investors to protect their investments, including long-term contracts with stabiliza-
tion clauses, international treaties, foreign investment laws, and dispute resolution mecha-
nisms, including international arbitration); on a critical view of the impact of arbitration in the 
hydrocarbon sector, see generally, Guillermo Jose Garcia Sanchez, A Critical Approach to Interna-
tional Investment Law, the Hydrocarbons Industry, and Its Relation to Domestic Institutions, 57 HARVARD 
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 475 (2016). 
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Principles for regulator’s decision-making processes and coordination on energy data.148 
Energy regulators should be independent and have clear rules that do not dis-
criminate against foreign entities that are transparent and have a guiding prin-
ciple integrating the energy markets. Regardless of the type of authority, poli-
cies that impact the energy sector should balance their goals with the goal of 
further integrating energy markets to strengthen north American energy inter-
dependence, resiliency, self-sufficiency, and transition.149 In other words, any 
government entity under these principles, must consider these elements as part 
of its energy decision-making process, and be transparent about how it reaches 
a particular decision.150 In the same vein, for energy markets to be properly 
integrated and face common challenges, it is required that states coordinate 
and share energy data.151 By exchanging and evaluating information, business 
and scientific uncertainty is reduced and regulators can engage in substantive 
discussions and negotiations.152 Mexico and the U.S. should harmonize and 
improve the availability of energy data across the region.153  
 
 
148 By regulators we mean any government official that has the power to affect energy markets 
through rule or norm making processes. As such, these include formal regulatory agencies, but 
also executive branch officials at the Ministry of Energy in Mexico and the Energy Department 
in the U.S. 
149 The U.S. Canada Side Letter on Energy establishes a cooperation principle that enhances 
‘the integration of North American energy markets based on market principles” and where 
the parties pledge to promote “North American energy cooperation, including with respect to 
energy security and efficiency, standards, joint analysis, and the development of common ap-
proaches.”, Art 3 U.S-Canada Side Letter on Energy, supra note. 
150 The U.S.-Canada Side Letter on Energy is an example of such a principle. According to 
Article 4.2 state that the government “shall endeavor to ensure that in the application of a 
energy regulatory measure, a energy regulatory authority within its territory avoid disruption 
of contractual relationships to the maximum extent possible, supports North American energy 
market integration, and provides for orderly and equitable implementation appropriate to 
those measures.” The Side letter also clarifies in footnote 3 that such a principles “does not 
apply to a measure related exclusively to the protection of human health or the environment.”, 
Art 4, U.S. Canada Side Letter on Energy, supra note 122.  
151 Timothy Meyer, Global Public Goods, Governance Risk, and International Energy, 22 DUKE JOUR-
NAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW 319 (2012). (arguing that many of the chal-
lenges faced by public good institutions can be attended by the exchange and evaluation of 
information.) 
152 Id. at 320. (Arguing in favor of the exchange and evaluation of information but also warning 
that “[i]nstitutions that emerge the knowledge-exchange and development process with the 
ability to negotiate and impose binding legal regulations thus run the risk that states that op-
pose the imposition of substantive regulations will use epistemic processes as a way to try to 
block the adoption of substantive regulation.”) 
153 The U.S.-Mexico Hydrocarbons Transboundary Agreement already contemplated a duty 
to share data concerning transboundary field and operations around the border, see Art. 4 
U.S.-Mexico Hydrocarbons Transboundary Agreement, supra note ; see also Section 2 of the 
U the U.S. Department of Interior and the Mexican Ministry of Energy also signed an MoU 
in 2016 to enhance cooperation, sharing of best practices and information involving the energy 
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Principles on cooperation in security and energy supply. Taking into account the 
interdependence of energy markets and the emergency situations faced by the 
region in the past decades, the energy partners should adopt protocols that 
recognize the principle to cooperate in emergency situations and alleviate the 
supply needs of the region.154 Examples of these cooperation mechanisms in-
clude the expansion of cross-border interconnections, pipelines, and the share 
of storage capacity for border towns.155  
Joint decision-making bodies. These energy partners should work to create a 
North American commission that serves as a connection point for coordinat-
ing energy policies to further integrate the region, but that also serves a plat-
form for discussing government decisions that might negatively impact the 
energy principles.156 Such a commission could receive several key charges. For 
one, this board could serve to resolve emergency issues such as the one faced 
in February 2020. They could approve or recommend emergency responses 
and help the relevant parties coordinate the response. The U.S. and Mexico 
have used this type of mechanism before to address challenges on joint natural 
 
 
resources on both sides of the border, Sect 2 Memorandum of Understanding between the 
Department of Interior of the United States of America and the Ministry of Energy of the 
United Mexican States, signed at Mexico City, February 2016, available at 
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/DOI%20-%20SENER%20MOU%20Fi-
nal%20Formatted%20US%20text%20-%20English.pdf [herein after the U.S.-Mexico MoU 
on Energy Cooperation] (Section 2 of the agreement enlists all of the exchanges of infor-
mation, procedures and best practices among the parties.)  
154 An example of such a principle can be found in Article 6 of the Agreement on ASEAN 
Energy Cooperation see Art. 6 Agreement on ASEAN Energy Cooperation, signed in Manila, 
1986-06-24, entered into force, 1987-04-26, available at http://agreement.asean.org/me-
dia/download/20170606100932.pdf (“Cooperation in security of energy supply. Recognizing 
the need to alleviate emergency situations relating to the shortage and/or oversupply of re-
newable and/or non-renewable energy products, the Member Countries shall endeavor to co-
operate in drawing up and concluding: i. emergency agreements for different energy forms as 
may be desirable from time to time; and ii. appropriate measures to cope with these emergency 
situations.”)  
155 Successful examples of cross border transmission lines helping the region to overcome 
blackouts, includes the 2011 Mexico’s transmission of 300 mw into the Texas grid in 2011, see 
Christopher Helman, Rolling Blackouts Force Texas To Import Power From Mexico, 
FORBES , https://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2011/02/03/rolling-
blackouts-force-texas-to-import-power-from-mexico/ (last visited Sep 13, 2021).  
156 U.S.-Mexico Energy Relations | Wilson Center, supra note 5. (This principle is also con-
sistent with the key recommendations from Wood and Ramiro, but it seeks to institutionalize 
further the relationship. Wood and Ramiro recommend a “return to regular meetings of the 
North America’s energy ministers” and to “reinvigorate the U.S.-Mexico Energy Business 
Council, with a renewed focus not just on hydrocarbons but also on renewable energy.”) 
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resources located at the border.157 This commission could also play an im-
portant role as an informal forum for dispute resolution when new circum-
stances or policies threaten North American energy trade.  
Even if these energy neighbors decide to forgo a commission, at a mini-
mum they could play a larger role in each other’s energy councils. For example, 
the U.S. and Mexico should consider allowing each other’s agencies to be ob-
servers in energy-related national commissions. Mexico should participate, at 
least as an observer, in the U.S. Interstate Oil & Gas Compact Commission. 
As a historical oil exporter, Mexico has historically cooperated more closely 
with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, whose interest was 
often opposed to the United States when it was a major net energy importer. 
Now that both Mexico and the United States have moved toward net zero 
energy exports—with important interests both as importers and as export-
ers—it would make more sense for them to align their policies. Certainly, to 
the extent that the Interstate Oil & Gas Compact Commission will be taking 
a larger role in avoiding oil and gas price spikes, Mexico could participate in 
these discussions.158 
Another minimum effort would be to reinvigorate the U.S.-Mexico Energy 
Business Council that was created in 2016 with the purpose of improving in-
stitutional relations among Mexican and U.S. agencies with the participation 
of energy companies.159 The Council is tasked with providing non-binding rec-




157 Most notably, Mexico and the U.S. have a water commission set up for the joint rivers at 
the border that has power to issue biding decisions on both sides of the border and that has 
the character of an international organization giving its members diplomatic protection, see 
Treaty on the Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, 
U.S.-Mex., art. 2 and 3, Feb. 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219 [hereinafter 1944 U.S. Mexico Rivers 
Treaty];  see also  Guillermo J. Garcia Sanchez & Richard J. Mclaughlin, The 2012 Agreement on 
the Exploitation of Transboundary Hydrocarbon Resources in the Gulf of Mexico: Confirmation of the Rule 
or Emergence of a New Practice, 37 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 681, 726–734, 761–767 (2015). (arguing that 
Mexico and the U.S. have a longstanding practice of creating joint commissions for the devel-
opment of transboundary resources but that they failed to create a strong commission for 
hydrocarbon resources in the Gulf of Mexico.) 
158 James W. Coleman, State Energy Cartels, CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2021). 
159 Terms of reference of the United States-Mexico Energy Business Council, Signed in 2016, 
available at https://legacy.trade.gov/hled/documents/Signed%20US-MEX%20En-
ergy%20Business%20Council%20Terms%20(May%202016%20-%20English).pdf (The En-
ergy Business Council was created as part of the commitments made in January 2015 during 
the U.S.-Mexico High Level Economic Dialogue) 
160 Id. (According to Section II of the Terms of reference “The Council’s objectives are to 1) 
facilitate the exchange of information between representatives of the energy industries from 
the United States and Mexico; and 2) encourage the development of actionable, non-binding 
recommendations for the benefit of the Participant’s governments”) 
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Cooperation for joint environmental and safety standards. Both nations should co-
operate in setting joint environmental and safety standards for the industry.161 
A transparent and consistent regulatory framework for the North American 
industry will make the region more competitive at the global level. The costs 
of differentiated standards are eventually translated into inefficient practices 
and prices to the consumer.162 The North American partners could elaborate 
these principles by high level dialogues among agencies or by setting up joint 
commissions under recommendations contemplated above.  
Transboundary resources related principles. The U.S. and Mexico should take the 
existing transboundary agreements on the joint development of resources at 
the borderline and integrate them in their energy relationship.163 The existing 
Transboundary Agreement on hydrocarbon resources located in the Gulf of 
Mexico should be used as the base for other resources located inland, such as 
the Burgos Basin in the Tamaulipas-Texas border, and for the resources lo-
cated in the 9 nautical miles that fall under the jurisdiction of Texas.164 The 
guiding principles should continue to be the efficient, effective, and joint de-
velopment of the resources, with a focus on ling-term economically feasible 
return for both nations. Moreover, in those applicable hydrocarbon fields, a 
principle of unitization of the area should guide any decision or policy on both 
 
 
161 The U.S and Mexico already have a duty to adopt common safety and environmental stand-
ards for transboundary fields in the Gulf of Mexico. They, however, have not enacted any 
since the signing of the Treaty. See, Art. 19 U.S.-Mexico Hydrocarbons Transboundary Agree-
ment, supra note .. (1. The Parties shall adopt, where appropriate, common safety and envi-
ronmental standards and requirements applicable to activity contemplated under this Agree-
ment. In any event, the Parties shall strive to ensure that their respective standards and re-
quirements are compatible where necessary for the safe, effective, and environmentally re-
sponsible implementation of this Agreement.”); See also Sect 3 of the U.S.-Mexico MoU on 
Energy, supra note …( Sect 3 enlists the modalities of cooperation including “mutually bene-
ficial exchanges and sharing of scientific and technical practices, knowledge and publicly avail-
able information; exchange visits of staff; meetings (including workshops, video-conferences, 
or webinars); cooperative research projects; joint studies; joint training; evaluation of effectives 
of activities; or other modalities of cooperation”) 
162 The USMCA does contemplate a duty to enact best regulatory practices and improve reg-
ulatory cooperation among the trade partners in order to “prevent, reduce or eliminate unnec-
essary regulatory differences to facilitate trade and promote economic growth, while maintain-
ing or enhancing standards of public health and safety and environmental protection.”, see 
Art 28.1, USMCA supra note 
163 Sanchez and Mclaughlin, supra note 156. (Describing in general how the Mexico agreement 
deviated from international practice and could be improved, particularly in its dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms and the decision-making processes of the joint commission) 
164 Jorge Vargas, The 2012 US Mexico Agreement on Transboundary Hydrocarbon Reservoirs in the Gulf 
of Mexico, A Blueprint for Progress or a Recipe for Conflict, 14 SAN DIEGO INTERNATIONAL LAW 
JOURNAL 3, 39 (2012). (describing the potential for joint gas developments in the Tamaulipas 
and Texas borderline) 
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sides of the border. This includes making it mandatory in any license, conces-
sion, or contract assign by the states.  
Community engagement principles. The construction of energy related infra-
structure in the region has direct impacts on different communities, many of 
them historically disenfranchised from the decision-making process of govern-
ments.165 Both the Canadian-U.S. border and the Mexican-U.S. border are 
home to ancestral communities and indigenous lands that have a historical and 
spiritual value to society. An efficient longstanding energy integrated region 
requires the consent of those communities and policies that reduce the impact 
of the investment on their lands. The new principles should go beyond the 
required duty to consult communities, and include principles of consensus 
building processes with them, the protection of their cultural and religious 
sites, and the share of benefits from the projects.166  Considering the potential 
of North America as an energy region can lead to decisions that avoid building 
infrastructure that will impact disenfranchised communities. For example, the 
passing of a pipeline through indigenous lands might seem like the only solu-
tion to bring communities from one coast to the other, but if regulators con-
sider the potential of using the neighboring state, alternative routes that 
seemed impossible before are visible to decisionmakers and companies. If 
states coordinate their energy policies, they could expand alternatives that do 





The borderlines of North America’s jurisdictions are increasingly irrelevant 
to the energy challenges spanning the continent. Storms that destroy energy 
infrastructure, excessive electricity demand during heat and cold waves, oil 
spills, and wild fires all flow unchecked across these borders. These are com-
mon challenges that require joint approaches. In fact, when governments jump 
into their “jurisdictional” trenches and avoid addressing regional energy chal-
lenges, the most common results are binational blackouts, inefficient allocation 
of investment and production capacity, and at the minimum, energy is wasted 
 
 
165 Guillermo Garcia Sanchez, When Drills and Pipelines Cross Indigenous Lands in the Americas, 51 
SETON HALL LAW REVIEW 1121 (2021). (discussing the conflicting principles that arise from 
investment arbitration law and international law on indigenous rights in the context of energy 
related projects in the American continent. Prof. Garcia Sanchez concludes that the system 
tends to monetize the value of indigenous lands as a solution to continue with the construction 
of energy related projects, leaving the communities on the wrong side of the cost benefit anal-
ysis.) 
166 Id. 
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on both sides of the border. The Winter storm that hit North Mexico and 
Texas in 2021 is just one example of these joint problems. Joint efforts and 
cooperation mechanisms are needed to meet these common energy challenges. 
As the center of the United States’ energy industry—the world’s biggest 
producer of both oil and natural gas—Texas is the crossroads for global en-
ergy. But it is also the center of the cross-border energy trade with Mexico that 
is a linchpin of the energy future in both countries. Mexico is the principle 
source for Texas growing natural gas exports and Texas is a likely consumer 
of the oil and renewable energy that Mexico hopes to produce in coming years. 
At the same time, new challenges have emerged to international energy trade 
and investment on both sides of the border. It is high time that North Amer-
ican policymakers developed an agenda to ensure that the U.S. and Mexico 
gain the full benefit promised by their potential collaboration. One lesson of 
the past decades is that the windows for furthering cross-border cooperation 
are often brief, and it is crucial to use them to set the stage for market integra-
tion driven by shifting energy markets. The agenda set forth in this report 
should provide a roadmap for policymakers to take advantage of the next op-
portunity to take full advantage of North America’s energy resources. 
